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Abstract: While liberal, redistributive views seek to correct and compensate for past 
injustices, by resorting to compensatory, procedural arguments for corrective justice, 
the recognition-based, communitarian arguments tend to promote by means of social 
movements and struggles for recognition a society free from prejudice and disrespect. 
In developing democratic societies such as Brazil, Axel Honneth’s contribution to 
the ongoing debates on Affirmative Action has been evoked, confirming that the 
dialectics of recognition does not merely seek a theoretical solution to the structural 
and economic inequalities that constitute some of their worst social pathologies, but 
allows for practices of self-respect and subjectivation that defy all technologies of 
social control, as pointed out in Foucault’s critique of power. The phenomenological 
deficit of critical theory consists thus in recasting the critique of power with a view to 
unveiling lifeworldly practices that resist systemic domination.
Keywords: Affirmative action; Critical theory; Lifeworld; Recognition; Self-respect; Social 
technologies
Resumo: Enquanto  concepções liberais redistributivas buscam corrigir e compensar as 
injustiças do passado, recorrendo a argumentos procedimentais reparativos em favor da 
justiça corretiva, os argumentos comunitaristas embasados no reconhecimento tendem a 
promover por meio de movimentos e lutas sociais pelo reconhecimento uma sociedade 
livre de preconceitos e desrespeito. Em sociedades democráticas em desenvolvimento, 
como o Brasil, a contribuição de Axel Honneth para os debates em curso sobre a Ação 
Afirmativa tem sido evocada, confirmando que a dialética do reconhecimento não se 
limita a procurar uma solução teórica para as desigualdades estruturais e econômicas 
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que constituem algumas das suas mais graves patologias sociais, mas permite que as 
práticas de autorrespeito e de subjetivação desafiem todas as tecnologias de controle 
social, como apontado na crítica do poder de Foucault. O déficit fenomenológico da 
teoria crítica consiste, portanto, em reformular a crítica do poder com o intuito de 
desvelar as práticas do mundo da vida que resistem à dominação sistêmica.
Palavras-chave: Ação afirmativa; Autorrespeito; Mundo da vida; Reconhecimento; Tecnologias 
sociais; Teoria crítica
From the standpoint of what Foucault called “biopolitics” (1991, 1997; 
Honneth, 1991, p. 169), affirmative action (AA) may be fairly defined as an 
institutional technology of social control that seeks to rectify past injustice and 
to obtain a situation closer to an ideal of equal opportunity by policies aimed 
at a historically, socio-politically non-dominant group (typically, minority 
groups and women of all races), especially intended to promote fair access to 
education or employment. For the sake of elucidating the normative claims 
of this paper, I shall confine myself to the usage of AA as it seeks to rectify 
racial inequalities in Brazil, particularly in educational policies, even though I 
believe that similar arguments might be offered to make a case against gender 
and other social, economic inequalities as well. I am thus confined to a social 
philosophical approach to the problem of normativity in liberal, egalitarian 
policymaking, as I assume from the outset that public policies refer to decision-
making processes that involve not only governmental power (esp. legislators 
and judicial decisions) but also civil society institutions broadly conceived, 
so as to comprise the public sphere, public opinion, social movements, trade 
unions, voluntary associations, NGOs, and numerous activities of individuals 
and interest groups. Since I am particularly interested in the social ethos and 
lifeworldly relationships in a given democratic political culture, I am assuming 
that the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) stands overall for the horizon of socially, 
culturally  sedimented  linguistic  meanings  that  make  up  the  background 
environment of competences, practices, and attitudes shared by social actors 
(Habermas, 1989, p. 119ss.) A phenomenological sociology of the lifeworld, 
in light of Alfred Schutz’s analysis of everyday practices, has proved indeed 
relevant to the Brazilian sociocultural context as shown by Hermilio Santos’s 
highly original study, “Interpretations of everyday life: approximations to the 
analysis of lifeworld” (Santos, 2009). The problematic relationship between 
systems and lifeworld lies, therefore, at the bottom of the normative grounds 
of social criticism, just as the basic ideas of cooperation and competition have 
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Habermas and Honneth’s criticisms of systemic power, I propose to recast 
AA as a systemic technique of intersubjective recognition and redistributive 
justice which cannot ultimately be separated from its correlated lifeworldly 
techniques of self-esteem, self-care, and self-understanding. My contention 
here is that Honneth’s theory of recognition successfully revisits Habermas’s 
critique of Foucault’s genealogy of power so as to address what I have dubbed 
“the phenomenological deficit of critical theory” (das phänomenologische 
Defizit der Kritischen Theorie), inherent in the Frankfurt School’s attempt at 
a dialectic of enlightenment that breaks away from the demonization of the 
technological, instrumental domination of nature. An upshot of such a self-
understanding of our modern condition is that the globalized, transnational 
phenomenon of juridification (Verrechtlichung) turns out to be an interesting 
instance of systemic-lifeworldly technologies that resist demonization as they 
contribute to accounting for the normative grounds of a critical theory of 
society at the same time that they function as efficient procedures of “reflective 
equilibrium” (in Rawlsian terminology) or as dispositifs, in the Foucaultian 
sense of technologies of power, at once reifying and breaking through a 
“linguistically generated intersubjectivity”. (Habermas, 1997, p. 297) Axel 
Honneth’s critique of the sociological and normative deficits of critical theory 
has been decisive for a more engaged, down-to-earth commitment towards 
the  implementation  of  the  very  egalitarian,  liberal,  and  communitarian   
ideals of self-respect, freedom, justice, and solidarity that such different 
authors as Rawls, Habermas, Foucault, and Fraser have stood for, even 
though stemming from somewhat opposing standpoints. Honneth’s recasting 
of Foucault’s power struggles for self-recognition (variously formulated as 
techniques of self-control, social and moral technologies) makes furthermore 
self-identity possible through the three forms of self-confidence, self-respect, 
and self-esteem in an intersubjective account of recognition (Honneth, 1996, 
chapter 5).
Much of what has been published and discussed about affirmative action 
is based upon personal opinions, feelings, and myths relating to ethnicity, 
gender, class, and other social constructs. When dealing with the social 
policies of AA we are often thinking of overcoming different forms of social 
prejudice, mostly unconscious or subtly embedded in our lifeworld. In itself, 
the act of discriminating is an epistemic category meant to differentiate, to 
discern, to judge how one thing differs from another on the basis of some 
rational criterion. Now, prejudice may be defined as a discrimination based 
on irrelevant grounds (social, racial or sexual). In conceptual terms, identity 
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egalitarianism and diversity. As it will be argued towards the end of this paper, 
I think that ontological commitments in social philosophy cannot be ultimately 
separated  from  the  correlated  conceptions  of  subjectivity  and  language. 
According to Mosley, AA arguments must thus focus on the attempt to render 
the semantic fields of “race” or “gender” relevant to basic opportunities. Such 
arguments tend to be utilitarian, as they refer to distributive justice, minimizing 
subordination and maximizing social utility (Mosley; Capaldi, 1997, p. 53). 
For Pojman, we must attend to the difference between Weak Affirmative Action 
and Strong Affirmative Action: the latter is defined as preferential treatment, 
discriminating in favor of members of underrepresented groups (often treated 
unjustly  or  marginalized  in  the  past),  while  the  former  simply  seeks  to 
promote equal opportunity to the goods and offices of a society. According 
to Pojman, since two wrongs don’t make a right, he concludes that Strong 
Affirmative Action is both racist and sexist, and defends Weak Affirmative 
Action to encourage minorities to strive for excellence in all areas of life (esp. 
education, public offices, employment), so as to avoid reverse discrimination 
(Shaw, 1998). Some of the most known AA policies are: preferential hiring, 
nontraditional casting, quotas, minority scholarships, equal opportunities 
for underrepresented groups, and even “reverse discrimination”, depending 
on the semantic, social context. This is certainly a rather simplified account 
of a complex issue, which I only evoke here in order to explore the social 
philosophical implications of policymaking procedures, as they were initially 
implemented in the US, especially against the background of the publication 
of Rawls’s A theory of justice in 1971. We may think of seminal papers by 
Thomas Nagel and Judith Jarvis Thomson in 1973, as the ongoing debates in 
the United States supporting and opposing affirmative action have shown the 
highly complex problem of social integration in a pluralist democracy that takes 
diversity seriously. According to recent research at Yale University, the largest 
beneficiaries of affirmative action to date in the US are Caucasian women, 
although white males may as well be said to have benefitted through bailouts, 
draft deferments, legacy admission into top universities, etc. At any rate, both 
backward-looking and forward-looking justifications of affirmative action, 
whether they tend to be more or less deontological or utilitarian, seem to require 
some substantive approach to racial and cultural identity, as shown by different 
arguments developed by moral thinkers such as Albert Mosley, Louis Pojman, 
and Robert Fullinwider (Cohen et al., 1977). The classical opposition of US 
conservative and “liberal” positions respectively against and for AA eventually 
gave way to a liberal-communitarian debate, following different receptions of 
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While liberal, redistributive views seek to correct and compensate for past 
injustice, by resorting to compensatory procedural, arguments for corrective 
justice, the recognition-based, communitarian arguments tend to promote by 
means of social movements and struggles for recognition a society free from 
prejudice and disrespect (Fraser; Honneth, 2003). In developing democratic 
societies such as Brazil, Axel Honneth’s contribution to this debate has been 
evoked, as over against Nancy Fraser’s redistributive account, just to confirm 
that the dialectics of recognition is far from accounting for the structural and 
economic inequalities that constitute some of the worst social pathologies, 
as shown in recent articles by Sérgio Costa, Paulo Neves, Celi Pinto, and 
Ricardo Mendonça. In order to go beyond the Fraser-Honneth debate, I have 
sought to revisit Honneth’s critique of Foucault’s genealogical account of 
power and of Habermas’s communicative action, by recasting a lifeworldly, 
nonreifying conception of juridification that meets social movements and 
identity claims stemming from grassroots practices of recognition from below. 
In effect, Honneth’s dialectics of recognition could offer us a much more 
defensible diagnosis of the Brazilian symbiosis between a slave-societal ethos, 
an ideology of racial democracy, and a lifeworldly praxis of racial disrespect 
as his “critique of power” reexamines the Foucaultian, Habermasian accounts 
of systemic power relations. Precisely because racial inequalities and ongoing 
discussions on AA social policies cannot be reduced to racialized, ideological 
discourses, the complex problem of intersubjective and hybrid accounts of 
self-identity, cultural identity, miscegenation, and social constructs such as 
race and gender must not be dismissed as too eclectic or too subjective, as 
critics of postmodernist and postcolonial studies seem to purport. 
Like most representatives of “liberal” and conservative standpoints, 
Mosley and Pojman had clearly different ideas about how to make things 
more equal for all. The main difference seems to consist in that Mosley doesn’t 
think equality means simply treating everyone equally, whereas Pojman takes 
equal treatment for an end result that would eliminate unjust discrimination. 
The term “reverse discrimination” has been used throughout most texts. 
The purpose of affirmative action is to open a door that was once closed. It 
allows people who are qualified to walk through. It increases competition 
from a world of work that was once white, male, heterosexual, abled bodied 
etc. to one that includes all people. In the US, we are often reminded that 
affirmative action even works for veterans! In Brazil, AA policies mainly 
refer to systems of preferred admissions (quotas) for racial minorities (blacks 
and native Brazilians), the poor and people with disabilities, and they have 
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as conditional cash transfer and similar welfare programs. One must not 
overlook that there are already quotas of up to 20% of vacancies reserved 
for the disabled in the civil public services. In the United States, access to 
the American Dream is often framed as a fair race in which the swiftest 
runners win. Critics say we should eliminate affirmative action because it 
gives some runners an unfair head start in an otherwise fair race. At the same 
time, many supporters of affirmative action say it is essential because some 
competitors are disabled and need a head start in order to compete in the race. 
But what if both of these perspectives miss the point about affirmative action? 
From this perspective, we can see that policies that promote inclusion, like 
affirmative action, are designed to equalize the conditions of a previously 
unfair race. Hence the emphasis on the Rawlsian principle of “fair equality 
of opportunities”, combined with the basic principle of “equal liberty”: just 
as one cannot promote universalizable ideals of justice and freedom without 
egalitarianism, one cannot celebrate diversity and the principle of difference (in 
its various social, egalitarian versions) without presupposing the fair equality 
of opportunities for all parties. The intuitive idea here is that all primary goods 
(liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, the bases of self-respect) are to 
be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any of these goods is 
to the advantage of the less favored (Rawls, 1971). We all know that there are 
numerous obstacles that litter the lanes of disadvantaged runners: historically, 
nonwhites have found their path blocked by racial discrimination; poverty 
creates broken lanes filled with potholes and other dangers; women find their 
lanes filled with impenetrable barriers; and urban youth are derailed far from 
the finish line by the school-to-prison pipeline. Meanwhile, those runners who 
aren’t kept back by race, class, or gender discrimination are privileged to 
run a race in which their ability to compete is not impeded by unwarranted 
arbitrary barriers. Some runners are luckier still. They are benefited by a host 
of privileges such as family connections, wealth, and an array of other factors 
that deliver them to the finish line ahead of all the other runners without 
even to have to break a sweat. Their lane is, in effect, a people-mover, an 
electrically powered lane that moves them along even when they simply 
assume the position of a runner while never having to actually lift a foot to 
propel themselves forward. To be sure, it is difficult for anyone to know what 
it feels like to be discriminated against unless it has happened to them. And yet, 
as Rawls himself suggested, one doesn’t have to be black, a woman, Jewish 
or gay to take a radical stand against racism, phallocentrism, anti-semitism 
or homophobia. The point here is that this is exactly why nobody should 
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should be treated equally with respect and given fair opportunity to flourish as 
human beings. People can thus respect each other’s differences and mutually 
recognize themselves as individuals and as members of distinct social, interest 
groups. Honneth’s conception of intersubjective recognition seeks precisely to 
move beyond the individualist, atomistic foundation for sociality and recast 
Habermas’s conception of individual self-formation through socialization by 
correcting some of the problems in the latter’s lifeworld-system divide. 
Gilberto Freyre’s 1933 seminal book Casa-Grande e Senzala (2006) – 
see ET: The Masters and the Slaves – has been hailed as the most representative 
work on Brazilian identity ever, opening up endless debates on collective self-
esteem, self-understanding, and race relations in Brazil, esp. racial mixture, the 
quasi-romantic idealization of the mulatto (pardo, moreno), and the so-called 
myth of racial democracy – even though there is no occurrence of the term in 
this book. Beyond its immediate context of the contemporaneous discussion 
on  regionalism  versus  universalism  following  the  Modern Art  Week  in 
1922, Freyre’s analyses contributed to new, comparative readings of slavery 
systems and racism in the Americas. One particular upshot of the racial 
democracy myth is the ideology of whitening and the concomitant practice 
of miscegenation or race mixture, described by many scholars as the primary 
pillar of white supremacy in Latin America, particularly in Brazil (Twine, 
1997, p. 87). According to Twine, the whitening ideology “was originally 
coined by the Brazilian elite to reconcile theories of scientific racism with the 
reality of the predominantly nonwhite population of their country” toward 
the turn of the 19th century. Thus Afro-Brazilian children are systematically 
disempowered as they learn not to talk about racism, regarded as a taboo 
subject for discussion with their parents and peers (Twine, 1997, p. 153). It 
was such a perverse circle that racial democracy has been fueling for decades 
throughout generations and it was only recently, especially after the end of 
military dictatorship in Brazil, that middle-class and the average citizen began 
talking about these social pathologies. Brazilian citizens have certainly been 
socialized into a racist, paternalist political culture, so full of contradictions 
and shortcomings when compared to the normative, regulative ideals of the 
democratic, egalitarian yardstick. And yet, this making of a political culture is 
only sustained to the extent that Brazilians also produce and reproduce such a 
culture. The shift from a hypocritical racial democracy towards a truly pluralist 
democracy has in effect been the only way out of the elitist pseudoliberalism 
of both military and civilian calls to “modernize” Brazil. Just as the aestheticist 
regionalism and nationalism of the modernist movement of the 1920s gave 
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to highlight the oligarchic, hierarchical relations of power that made Brazil 
one of the most socially unequal nations of the planet, a moral revolution 
from below alone can secure the rule of law for all and call for a public, 
democratic distribution of primary goods. If Brazil remains too far from a 
well ordered society and public participation in the bargain processes is still 
remote from vast, excluded segments of the population, the political thrust 
of social movements meets a fortiori the normative criteria of a concept of 
democracy that defies and transgresses any corrupted, systemic “power that 
be” for the sake of the people. The egalitarian premises in AA procedures can 
do precisely that, whenever one has to be reminded that the outcast in Brazil 
discover their own identity as citizens, rights-bearers or as end-in-themselves 
only when they become visible in the public sphere and get talked about in 
the media. Hence a radical critique of state and society is not necessarily 
opposed to the regulative ideals of a procedural theory of justice. In his highly 
original account of racial problems in Brazil, Costa has taken a critical stand 
against modernist, teleological accounts of racism such as those inspired by 
Habermas, Beck and Giddens’s analyses of social pathologies, to a great extent 
because of the limitations of importing European patterns of modernity and 
identity to the Brazilian context. On the other hand, however, even though he 
praises postcolonial studies for being particularly useful for his own refusal to 
import US, binary categories of anti-racism, Costa remains skeptical about the 
normative deficit of Brazilian sociological contributions to this ongoing debate 
(Costa, 2006). In another assessment of the same problem, Costa argues that the 
category of race, once transformed into a tool for social analysis and normative 
desideratum, leads to an incomplete, biased understanding of the Brazilian 
makeup, an objectifying view of social relations and eventually to a reduction 
of social identities to their political, instrumental dimension (Costa, 2002). 
In order to tackle the problem of racial identity in Brazil, Mendonça recasts 
Habermas’s discourse, communicative theory to arbitrate between Honneth’s 
self-realization and Fraser’s parity of participation guiding ideas: if it is only 
through interactive participation that self-realization can be ultimately thought 
in moral terms, one must inevitably resort to a sound socialization so that 
individuals are empowered to affirm themselves as social actors and take part 
in the effective construction of a just society, by means of free exchanges and 
interplays of revisable validity claims (Mendonça, 2007). A similar argument 
of complementarity is offered by Pinto, albeit from a different programmatic 
platform. According to Pinto, distribution cannot be reduced to recognition, 
as this would render the question of justice void. Recognition is, moreover, a 
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both its heuristic value for social theory and its potential for struggles for 
justice. Recognition qua self-recognition (self-esteem, in Honneth) and qua 
status (in Fraser) are not mutually exclusive, but are different moments of the 
same process of theoretical elaboration and political struggle, and might be 
regarded in many circumstances as complementary notions. Recognition as 
public policy and as state policy are not contingent upon the self-recognition 
of individual subjects, but are limited to a specific range of “remedies”, 
to  employ  Fraser’s  terminology.  On  the  other  hand,  according  to  Pinto, 
recognition as self-recognition is essential to the construction of the subject 
of action in social struggles. There are only “dominated” insofar as they 
recognize themselves as such in their struggles against “domination”. There 
is no such a thing as feminism before the emergence of the feminist, just as 
there is no parity of participation prior to the self-recognized subject as an 
equal. Finally, both in Fraser and in Honneth, the moments of construction of 
situations of disrespect are absent, just as the shift from nonrecognition and 
misrecognition to recognition, which renders the scope of both theories quite 
narrow (Pinto, 2008). In the last analysis, the problem is whether recognition 
can actually function as some form of moral principle, as Honneth claims, even 
if he does not assume it to be taken for a foundational or unifying principle 
(systematically conceived, not necessarily as in a metaphysical system, since 
Honneth’s critical reading of Hegel is clearly postmetaphysical). Honneth 
has in effect set up an interdisciplinary research program that accounts both 
for a theory of justice and for a theory of democracy: recognition is what 
sets democracy in motion, making it both possible and desirable, as we are 
always caught up in ongoing struggles for recognition. We are thus led from 
a dialectical appropriation of Freyre’s problematic account of racial relations 
and the social patterns of disrespect, misrecognition, and recognition towards 
social policies meant to promote self-realization through the self-assertion and 
self-understanding of Afro-Brazilians’ social struggles and their normative 
claims raised in these struggles. It seems that Honneth’s theory of recognition 
becomes even more relevant for AA social policies when it is recast in light 
of its point of departure vis à vis Habermas’s critique of Foucault’s systemic 
techniques of power.
In his Critique of power, Honneth sets out to show “that Adorno must 
have failed in the task of an analysis of society, since throughout his life he 
remained imprisoned to a totalized model of the domination of nature and was 
thus unable to comprehend the ‘social’ in societies” (1991, p. xii). Honneth 
regarded the Dialektik der Aufklärung as one of the most representative works 
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disenchantments, and social pathologies. But it is only by alluding to both 
Foucault and Habermas, that Honneth seeks to move beyond this modern 
predicament, as they propose post-Hegelian, alternative accounts in their 
respective opposing views of power. While Foucault rehabilitates an “action-
theoretic paradigm of struggle”, Habermas calls for a paradigm of “mutual 
understanding”. Both models can be thus regarded as alternative accounts to the 
sociological deficits of critical theory and earlier phenomenology. My working 
hypothesis here is that Honneth’s indebtedness to Habermas and Foucault 
betrays, furthermore, the other two Hs – Husserl and Heidegger—which, 
together with Hegel, were so decisive for the phenomenological emergence of 
intersubjective themes such as recognition, liberation, and alterity in postwar 
France. According to Honneth (1996, p. 156), the kernel of Sartre’s social 
philosophy is that “social conflicts are to be understood, above all, as disruptions 
in the relationships of recognition between collective actors”. Sartre saw thus 
anti-semitism as a form of social disrespect as he shifts away from the reciprocal 
reification of the ontological dualism between the en-soi and the pour-soi of his 
earlier phenomenological account of otherness in L’être et le néant. Granted, 
Sartre’s indebtedness to the Hegelian conception of intersubjectivity took him 
farther beyond Husserl’s solipsistic account of consciousness and Heidegger’s 
self-deceptive conception of Dasein, so that his recasting of the three Hs 
(Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger) paved the way for his later critique of colonialism 
and his Marxist, liberationist theory of recognition inherent in his praise of 
négritude. As early as 1956, Sartre denounced “colonialism [as] a system that 
infects us with its racism” (Sartre, 1956). Honneth follows Habermas when the 
latter argues that Sartre’s moral decisionism, like Heidegger’s and Foucault’s, 
cannot account for the normative thrust needed to carry out emancipatory 
struggles for recognition, even though his unmasking of imperialism and 
colonial power pointed to the crisis of Cold War capitalism (Honneth, 1996, 
p. 159). Habermas’s own theory of communicative action sought to overcome 
the late capitalist crisis of legitimation, without falling back in the aporias of 
a critique of ideology and philosophies of consciousness, on the one hand, 
and avoiding the pitfalls of relativism, skepticism and historicism, on the 
other, resulting from postmodern criticisms of modernity. Habermas reclaims 
thus the Kantian legacy of a normative foundation for the political sphere, at 
the same time that he maintains the separation of morality and legality, and 
the primacy of a communicative normativity regulated by rational discourse, 
shared by all and capable of guiding human action in democratic, pluralist 
societies. Political questions are to be debated, therefore, within the context 
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hence both normative and universalizable. The Habermasian theory succeeds 
in articulating the question of normativity with the political, social question 
of institutionalization, in the very conception of an integrated model which 
differentiates the systemic world of institutions (defined by their capacity of 
responding to the functional demands imposed by the environment /context) 
from the lifeworld (Lebenswelt, i.e. forms of cultural, societal, and interpersonal 
reproduction that are integrated through the norms consensually accepted by 
all participants in the social world). And yet, insofar as it is conceived both as 
the precondition and starting point for a process of systemic differentiation and 
as the threatened pole of systemic imperatives leading to the colonization of the 
lifeworld, modern rationalization seems to fall prey to an inevitable paradox, 
as Habermas himself pointed out in his meticulous analyses of lifeworld and 
system (1989). While the rationalization of the Lebenswelt renders possible the 
differentiation of autonomous subsystems, opening thus the utopian horizon 
of a civil society in which the spheres of action formally organized constitute 
the foundations of the post-traditional social world of human beings (private 
sphere) and citizens (public sphere), it seems to dig, however, its own grave 
in a technological society dominated by monetarization and bureaucratization. 
Habermas’s own solution out of this impasse consists precisely in resorting 
to  communicative  reason,  as  opposed  to  instrumental,  purpose-oriented 
rationality (Zweckrationalität), so as to avoid the reifying mechanisms of the 
coordination of actions, social integration, and symbolic reproduction. As 
Albrecht Wellmer remarked, Habermas in fact reformulated the same paradox 
of rationalization already at work in Weber, Adorno, and Horkheimer’s critical 
analyses of capitalism, with the important proviso that the emergence of a 
post-traditional rationality in modern Europe allows for “different possible 
constellations concerning the relationship between system and lifeworld” 
(Bernstein, 1985, p. 57). Nevertheless, it seems that we can hardly move 
beyond this paradoxical, vicious circle every time we revisit the problem of 
normativity at stake. If on the one hand, we cannot simply square normativity 
with the lifeworld, as opposed to the technization of cognitive and practical 
relationships  and  the  instrumental  dealings  of  differentiated  institutional 
systems, the paradox will simply persist, on the other hand, within any attempt 
at coordinating a supposedly democratic “consensual action”. Hence, just as 
Habermas saw the same problem inherent in Rawls’s contractarian “original 
position”, Wellmer spots here the impossibility of defeating a self-vindicating 
rationality, whose practical intent is anchored in lifeworldly, tacit assumptions, 
posited with the avoidance of performative contradictions every time one has 
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functions thus like the “grammaticalness we have for the sentences of our 
native language” (Rawls, 1999, p. 41) – we do not even care to think about 
it, but it has been always already presupposed by all speakers. To be sure, 
as Wellmer remarked, idealized lifeworlds might strike us as nonsense or 
undesirable chimeras but, like Rawls’s procedural devices of the well-ordered 
society and reflective equilibrium, they might help us in thought experiments 
that call into question our intuitive, taken-for-granted notions of equality and 
freedom. In effect, both Rawls and Habermas follow Kant’s procedural wager 
that no rational means-ends system can defy the irreducibility of human means 
to their ultimate, universalizable ends, since human dignity or humanity is 
to be regarded as an ultimate end in itself (Endzweck). In one of Habermas’s 
earliest reflections on the relationship between technology, science, and the 
lifeworld in the 60s we read:
I should like to reformulate this problem with reference to political 
decision-making. In what follows we shall understand ‘technology’ 
to mean scientifically rationalized control of objectified processes. 
It refers to the system in which research and technology are coupled 
with feedback from the  economy and administration. We shall 
understand ‘democracy’ to mean the institutionally secured forms 
of general and public communication that deal with the practical 
question of how [humans] can and want to live under the objective 
conditions of their ever-expanding power of control. Our problem 
can then be stated as one of the relation between technology and 
democracy: how can the power of technical control be brought 
within the range of the consensus of acting and transacting citizens? 
(Habermas, 1970, p. 57).
Like  Rawls  and  Honneth,  Habermas  refuses  to  reduce  the  social 
construction  of  rule-following  procedures  to  a  rational  choice  theory  or 
utilitarian calculus, just as they all resist a decisionist condemnation of the 
technological society and its self-regulating institutions as one finds, say, in 
Martin Heidegger and Jacques Ellul. Like revisited versions of the Pascalian 
wager, Habermas’s modernist creed constantly seeks to render its premises 
reasonably credible, as his ethical universalism engages in endless battles 
with infidels and believers from every hill. As one of his most sympathetic 
interlocutors remarked, 
Can we still, in our time, provide a rational justification for universal 
normative standards? Or are we faced with relativism, decisionism, 
or emotivism which hold that ultimate norms are arbitrary and 
beyond rational warrantability? These became primary questions 
for Habermas. The fate – indeed, the very possibility – of human 
emancipation depends on giving an affirmative answer to the first 
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It seems to be fair enough to gather that Habermas has sought to rescue 
the normative grounds of modern liberal democracies, against the diversity 
of communicative, lifeworldly backgrounds, without falling back into some 
form of absolutism (as one finds in religious and metaphysical models) or 
succumbing to relativism, nihilism or historicism (as Heidegger, Foucault, 
and postmodernists do, according to Habermas). Hence, the technological 
modern predicament is not so much how to make a good use of natural and 
social resources (as if we could simply use those things like tools) but rather 
how to deal responsibly and democratically with the uncoupling of systems 
and lifeworlds, as the latter cannot be reduced to the former. Habermas’s 
own proposal out of the pickle is to recast the normative thrust of democracy 
in critical-theoretical terms, so that the satisfaction of functional needs of 
action systematically integrated must find its limits in the integrity of the 
lifeworld, i.e. in the very demands of the spheres of action which are socially, 
communicatively integrated (Habermas, 1984, p. 307). Although I cannot 
elaborate on this question here, it is my contention that Sandel’s criticisms 
addressed to Rawls’s liberalism may as well be applied to the Habermasian 
attempt to articulate a Kantian proceduralism with a Hegelian-inspired view of 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Honneth’s critique of Habermas’s dualistic conception 
of society aims precisely at this, which might be perceived as a systemic flaw: 
one must go back to substantive conceptions of the good in order to account 
for the best procedures, even with a view to repairing injustice (Honneth, 1991,   
p. 221). Honneth addresses Habermas’s immanent critique as still indebted to a 
“philosophy of history influenced by Heideggerian Marxism”, so as to unmask 
the anthropological blindspots of his confusing accounts of systemic and 
lifeworldly fictions. Indeed, a similar problem lies at Habermas’s procedural 
formulation of the ideal speech situation, which can be solved with the support 
of an analysis of civil society’s voluntary associations that secure democratic 
values against the state and economic colonizations of the lifeworld. In his later 
formulation of his procedural model of deliberative, participatory democracy 
in Faktizität und Geltung (Between Facts and Norms), Habermas contends that 
his theory of communicative action stands as a third way between a systemic-
theoretical sociology of law (such as the one advocated by Niklas Luhmann) 
and a liberal, universalist theory of justice (such as John Rawls’s). After having 
developed a theory of justice in vacuo, says Habermas, Rawls recasts the “old 
problem of how the rational project of a just society, in abstract contrast to 
an obtuse reality, can be realized after confidence in the dialectic of reason 
and revolution, played out by Hegel and Marx as a philosophy of history, has 
been exhausted – and only the reformist path of trial and error remains both 382   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 3, p. 369-385, set.-dez. 2009
practically available and morally reasonable” (Habermas, 1998, p. 57). For 
Habermas, Rawls’s problem appears as “the return of a repressed problem”, 
insofar as it recasts the modern model of natural law (social contract) in 
procedural terms (original position). Nevertheless, as Dick Bernstein put it so 
well, we end up with an epistemic justification paradox of self-referentiality 
at the very uncoupling of systems and lifeworld: 
[Habermas] wants to do justice to the integrity of the lifeworld 
and social systems, and to show how each presupposes the other. 
We cannot understand the character of the lifeworld unless we 
understand the social systems that shape it, and we cannot understand 
social systems unless we see how they arise out of activities of 
social agents. The synthesis of system and lifeworld orientations 
is integrated with Habermas’s delineation of different forms of 
rationality  and  rationalization:  systems  rationality  is  a  type  of 
purposive-rational rationality, lifeworld rationality is communicative 
rationality (Bernstein, 1985, p. 20).
Along the same lines and reminiscent of Honneth’s own assessment, James 
Bohman has remarked that “Habermas’s criticism of modern societies turns 
on the explanation of the relationship between two very different theoretical 
terms: a micro-theory of rationality based on communicative coordination 
and a macro-theory of the systemic integration of modern societies in such 
mechanisms as the market” (Habermas, 1997). To be sure, there is no clear-cut 
separation of lifeworld and systems rationalities, since it is precisely because 
of the systemic colonization of the lifeworld that social actors can have more 
and more access to its general structures and are urged to seek integration 
amid all complex differentiations, with a view to attaining emancipation and 
understanding. Hence, to the structural differentiation of the lifeworld in its 
social integration, cultural reproduction and personal socialization, there 
must be an interactive differentiation of the systemic institutions steered 
by  money  and  power  (economy  and  bureaucratic  administration).  What 
is at stake, after all, is the institutionalization of the social world, beyond 
traditional accounts of society and state. Honneth has convincingly shown, 
however, the impossibility of maintaining communicative reason immune 
from the instrumentalization of social action in the very attempt to tackle 
the paradox of the rationalization of lifeworldly relations, as anticipated by 
Habermas’s own account of socialization. In this sense, it seems that one is 
condemned to the Foucaultian predicament of social technologies, at once 
systemic and lifeworldly, as the reification implicit in the very interplay of 
recognition and disrespect seems to provide us with a good phenomenological 
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of intersubjectivity. By effecting a rapprochement between the procedural 
conceptions of a reflective equilibrium (Rawls) and the lifeworld (Habermas) 
we can thus reenact, as it were, a hermeneutics of normativity correlated to the 
facticity of a democratic ethos inherent in a pluralist, political culture, capable 
of integrating systemic and pragmatic aspects of a diversity of practices and 
codifications (modus vivendi) that subscribe to an overlapping consensus, 
especially when dealing with universalizable claims and local action practices, 
such as human rights and public policies, among which AA procedures stand 
out as reifying and demythologizing remedies. Social philosophy can be thus 
recast as a correlate of a philosophy of nature that allows for sustainable 
technologies that effect the return of ecological themes such as home, earth, 
and global dwelling without romanticism or the nostalgia for a primordial 
reconciliation of technique and nature. Even though I won’t be able to elaborate 
on these developments in this paper, it is my contention that Foucault’s 
critique of a neoliberal “technological society” (to paraphrase Ellul) cannot 
be dismissed as a nihilistic, postmodernist threat to the unfinished project of 
emancipatory democratization –as Habermas insinuated in his Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity – but may as well be integrated into a sustainable 
critique of the modern pathologies of 21st-century capitalism. As Nancy Fraser 
rightly observed, we must draw an important distinction between Foucault’s 
empirical insights and the normative problems inherent in his writings, as we 
distinguish, say, Foucault’s genealogical analyses of the state qua “technology 
of government” from the normative thrust of “new modes of governmentality” 
in postnational configurations of “neoliberal globalization” (Fraser, 2008). 
Social technologies such as AA procedures are, therefore, revealing for the 
“ontological history of ourselves”, bringing together interplays of knowledge 
and power, intersubjective and reflective accounts of self-understanding. 
Following Honneth’s recasting of the critique of power, the phenomenological 
deficit of critical theory ultimately unveils communicative networks and 
lifeworldly practices that resist systemic domination. Thus technologies of 
power and techniques of the self are brought together so as to make sense 
of the correlation between discursive and nondiscursive practices, epistemai 
and dispositifs, knowledge and power relations in the intricate networks of 
socialization, individualization, and normalization that make up subjectivation 
(Foucault, 2001. As Foucault himself remarked,
I think that if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject 
in Western civilization, [s]he has to take into account not only 
techniques of domination but also techniques of the self. Let’s say: 
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types of techniques – techniques of domination and techniques 
of the self. [S]he has to take into account the points where the 
technologies of domination of individuals over one another have 
recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon [her]himself. 
And conversely, [s]he has to take into account the points where the 
techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion and 
domination. The contact point, where the individuals are driven by 
others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we can 
call, I think government. Governing people, in the broad meaning 
of the word, governing people is not a way to force people to do 
what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with 
complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure 
coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or 
modified by [her]himself (Foucault, 1991, p. 203-204).
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